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                              Abstract
This study investigates the institutional and policy issues that limit effective participation of resource users in community watershed programs and 
identifies key lessons for harnessing collective action and its effectiveness in achieving economic and environmental outcomes. It shows that spatial 
and temporal attributes of watersheds and the associated market failures that accelerate degradation of agricultural and environmental resources 
require innovative policy and institutional arrangements for coordinating use and management of resources. Under enabling policies, IWM can 
effectively contribute towards diversification of production into high-value products, reversal of resource degradation, growth in the incomes of the 
poor and enhance the ability to mitigate the effect of drought. However, the degree of biophysical and social complexity within watershed 
communities could often undermine incentives for collective action, thwart distribution of benefits against the landless and resource-poor households 
and even lead to depletion of groundwater resources. Governments and other stakeholders have a unique role to play in kick-starting the process of 
transformation through strategic natural resource and productivity-enhancing investments that strengthen local capacity for collective action and 
generate local public goods. Such collective investments could serve as building blocks for private productivity-enhancing and risk-mitigating 
investments as they boost profitability of productive assets (land and labor) and encourage farmer adoption of beneficial conservation practices. The 
lessons and experiences also show that integrating interventions along watershed frontiers would require a flexible learning alliance of institutions and 
cross-disciplinary teams with complementary skills and competencies. 
Key words: Institutional and policy issues, community watershed programs, environmental resources, investments. 
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 Introduction
Rainfed areas in semi-arid India account for two-thirds of the 
cultivable land and house a large share of the poor, food insecure 
and vulnerable population of the country. Moreover, as 
productivity growth in the more favored Green Revolution areas 
is showing signs of slowing down or stagnation 16, future growth 
in agricultural production and food security is likely to depend on 
improving productivity in the semi-arid rainfed areas. There is 
also some evidence indicating that returns to investments would 
be substantially higher in these regions when compared to the 
irrigated regions, where the potential for productivity growth has 
been exploited through Green Revolution technologies 3.
    Integrated watershed management (IWM) has been promoted 
as a suitable strategy for improving productivity and sustainable 
intensification of agriculture in rainfed drought-prone regions. 
India has one of the largest micro-watershed development 
programs in the world. Over $500 million is being spent annually 
through various projects supported by the government, NGOs 
and bilateral funds 4. The watershed development program was 
expanded and strengthened since the mid 1990s by introducing 
new guidelines, additional funds and the creation of new 
institutional structures that aimed to increase community 
participation and sustainability of the program. Despite the 
progress in terms of coverage and effectiveness, the program has 
been rather slow given the magnitude of the problem; only about 
10% of the land requiring treatment has been covered 18. The 
benefits also tend to favor those who own land and could afford 
investments in tube and open wells for irrigation 19.
  Today the concept of IWM is recognized to go beyond 
traditional integrated technical interventions for soil and water 
conservation to include multiple crop-livestock and market related 
innovations that support and diversify livelihoods to better 
withstand risks induced by market and climatic variability. The 
concept ties together the biophysical notion of a watershed as a 
hydrological unit with that of the community and institutional 
factors that regulate the demand and determine the viability and 
sustainability of such interventions. The hydrological approach 
helps to identify the appropriate technical interventions on the 
supply side while the village or community-based planning and 
implementation is fundamental for creating institutions for 
community empowerment and sustainability on the demand side. 
The landscape level but community-based IWM interventions 
create synergies between targeted technologies, policies and 
institutions that improve productivity, resource use sustainability 
and market access for the resource users 30.
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   However, effective implementation of an IWM program requires 
careful consideration of the special characteristics of watersheds 
both as biophysical as well as socioeconomic units and the 
implications for policy and institutional arrangements. Watersheds 
encompass diverse natural resources (soil, water, trees, 
biodiversity, etc.) utilized by diverse groups of people holding 
unequal use rights and entitlements 4, 7, 8, 11. Watersheds are also 
inhabited by socially heterogeneous groups of people located at 
different points along the terrain creating potential conflicts in 
resource use between those on the upper, middle and lower reaches 
of catchment. Clearly, watersheds are ecologically and socially 
complex geographical units characterized by temporal and spatial 
interdependence between resources as well as resource users. 
This implies that effectiveness of watershed interventions will 
depend on the ability to treat the entire hydrological landscape, 
not just a portion of it. 
   Moreover, because of the lateral and downhill movement of soil 
and water resources 29, unilateral action taken by any single 
resource user may impose positive or negative consequences 
(externalities) on any other resource user. The ability to exclude or 
prevent these externalities is determined by the nature of property 
rights held by the resource users. When negative externalities are 
difficult to exclude or prevent at low cost, some of the production 
and resource use decisions for certain resources may fall under 
the control of other agents. When the externalities are negative, 
the production or resource use levels may be socially supra optimal. 
The reverse is true for desirable externalities for which individual 
resource users are not fully compensated. The ability to internalize 
these kinds of mutual spillover effects resulting from spatial and 
temporal interdependence among resource users requires 
interventions mediated through targeted policies and institutional 
incentives that encourage cooperation and collective action. 
Fragmented land ownership and settlement patterns coupled with 
unequal access and use rights create conflict and diverging 
interests. This reduces the incentives for cooperation and 
increases the transaction costs involved in organizing resource 
users for collective action. 
   Based on the lessons and experiences in semi-arid India, this 
paper revisits the key policy and institutional needs for IWM and 
offers new insights on how the IWM approach, if complemented 
by suitable policy and institutional innovations, could contribute 
to improvement and reduced vulnerability of livelihoods and 
economic and environmental conditions in drought-prone regions. 
The paper reviews the key policy and institutional challenges 
that face integrated management of watersheds, highlights issues 
related to organization and governance of community watersheds 
and presents the key factors that determine the incentives for 
community participation and collective action. This is followed 
by discussion of the diverse livelihood and environmental impacts 
of IWM and the drivers of change based on a case study of semi- 
arid watershed villages in India. The final section concludes with 
a brief summary and implications for policy. 
   Policy and Institutional Issues
A number of factors that determine incentives for collective action 
in natural resource management have been discussed 1, 6, 14, 15.
Three major factors seem to determine the incentives for individual 
participation in watershed management programs. These are spatial 
scale, temporal scale and property rights 27,  29. These factors imply 
the need for certain policy and institutional arrangements to 
enhance individual incentives for collective action in watershed 
management.
   A watershed is a catchment area from which all water drains into 
a common point, making it an attractive unit for technical efforts 
to manage water and soil resources. A watershed is a spatially 
defined unit that includes diverse natural resources that are 
unevenly distributed within a given geographical area. This creates 
interdependence between resources as well as resource users 
over time and space. For example, soil degradation from the upper 
reaches of a catchment affects economic and ecological functions 
in the lower reaches of a catchment. By definition, watersheds 
require a hydrologically defined spatial scale for technological 
interventions to succeed. The actual size of this unit depends on 
topographic and agro-climatic conditions and may range from a 
few hectares (ha) to over thousand ha. This implies that 
effectiveness of watershed interventions will depend on the ability 
to treat the entire hydrological landscape, not just a portion of it. 
   On the other hand, investments in several natural resource 
management (NRM) technologies required for watershed 
management do not payback in a short period. Typical examples 
are tree planting, construction of check dams and terraces for soil 
and water conservation. Unlike the seed-based crop production 
technologies that provide returns within a single season, NRM 
technologies often have a longer gestation period. The costs are 
incurred upfront, while economic returns are often delayed and 
accrue in small incremental flows over a long period. Some of the 
social benefits from watershed management are non-tangible public 
goods such as improvements in ecological functions and 
environmental services that improve sustainability and ecosystem 
health. Such benefits are not fully captured by individual resource 
users. This means that unlike other short-duration agricultural 
technologies (e.g., new varieties) the resource-improving IWM 
interventions require a relatively longer planning horizon 24.
   Another important factor in IWM is related to the property rights 
regime that governs the use of land, water, forest and other 
resources. Costs and benefits from watershed development efforts 
are determined by the stock of resource use rights and entitlements 
of individual holders and the ability to exclude others from 
benefiting with such investments. Excludability depends on 
biophysical conditions (e.g., topography), property rights and 
the prevailing legal and institutional framework, including 
customary laws. In many cases, land is either privately owned or 
leased from the government or other rights owners based on some 
defined contracts. In the latter case, land cannot be sold and may 
not be used as collateral to access institutional loans. Surface 
(rivers and lakes) and groundwater resources are mainly held under 
common property regimes. This means that resource users 
belonging to certain group will have unregulated access to exploit 
these resources typically without payment. These resources are 
not priced and in the absence of collective action, there is lack of 
incentives and institutional mechanism to regulate use. This can 
cause a major problem in watershed management. For example, 
when water is free and regulatory systems are now in place, the 
groundwater level in watersheds begins to decline while the 
individual cost of drilling a new well increases. A study in 12 semi- 
arid villages of Andhra Pradesh has shown that more than 65% of 
the open wells and 28–45% of the tube wells have dried up. In 
many of the villages, more than 90% of the open wells have 
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completely dried up 26.
    Clearly defined and secure property rights would combine the 
elements of excludability, duration, robustness and assurance 17.
Duration measures the temporal extent of the rights; robustness 
measures the scope and depth of the rights held; assurance 
measures the ability to enforce the agreed rights. In watersheds, 
there is a lateral movement of soil and water resources. Unilateral 
action taken by any single resource user may impose positive or 
negative consequences (externalities) on any other resource user. 
In some cases, the externalities move in one direction (unidirectional 
externalities) while in other cases they may move in multiple 
directions (reciprocal externalities). Lack of excludability of 
undesirable effects means that part of their resource use decisions 
and production choices fall under the control of other farmers. In 
the presence of negative externalities, the level of private resource 
use is in excess of what is socially optimal while the reverse is true 
in cases where the effect is positive. These kinds of mutual spillover 
effects that emerge from spatial and temporal interdependence 
among resource users require interventions mediated through 
targeted policies and institutional incentives that encourage 
cooperation and collective action. 
 The social dimension is also important for IWM; diverse social 
groups with differing entitlements and rights to use natural 
resources inhabit watersheds. Ethnic and tribal heterogeneity as 
well as unequal rights to land and water among the inhabitants 
often imply that costs and benefits from watershed investments 
are unequally distributed. Fragmented land ownership and 
settlement patterns coupled with unequal access and use rights 
create conflict and diverging interests. This reduces the incentives 
for cooperation and increases the transaction costs involved in 
organizing resource users for collective action. The classic 
mismatch between the boundaries of the watershed and a village 
or a community is well known. Rivers and other natural boundaries 
often delineate villages or local administrative units whereas they 
often lie at the interior of a watershed. A good strategy to overcome 
this problem is to identify a village that coincides with a micro- 
watershed that will in turn form a watershed when multiple villages 
are brought together. The biophysical and social complexities and 
the need to harmonize the two for sustainable NRM will require 
appropriate policy and institutional arrangements that promote 
both private and collective efforts. 
                     Organizational Issues
The success of collective action in natural resource management 
has been associated with organizational structure and governance. 
However, the form of organizational structure is likely to depend 
on the type of problem and the existing socio-cultural conditions 
within the communities. Organizational and governance structures 
imposed from the top or from outside agencies are less likely to 
function effectively. Those emerging from local practices and 
traditions may have a better chance, but often tend to maintain 
the status quo (i.e., benefit powerful sections and exclude the 
voiceless and marginalized). A related factor is the need for a 
legislative framework within which farmer organizations operate 
to develop and promote good governance. Legislative frameworks 
that limit the role of governments to provision of an enabling 
policy environment and that encourage farmer organizations to 
function as private sector and business-oriented enterprises are 
considered useful for the success of collective efforts 5.
   However, collective action in watershed management is very 
unlikely to emerge autonomously on its own. This is mainly 
because small farmers and resource users are often disorganized 
and scattered and face high transactions costs in mobilizing 
communities. Building institutions for collective action in 
watershed management requires formulation of rules, regulations 
and guidelines that facilitate effective implementation of 
community programs 20. There is a clear role for the state in terms 
of defining proper guidelines and rules, which facilitate 
cooperation and collaboration among resource users and provide 
a legal framework for existence of community organizations. There 
is also a role for the state in terms of providing strategic public 
support in establishing community and local public goods that 
serve as the founding blocks for emergence of successful and 
effective collective action. However, the level of such support 
that communities may require is likely to be context specific. Proper 
targeting of such support and establishing the legal checks and 
balances needed to prevent misappropriation of funds and 
opportunistic behavior is also essential. 
     Proper organizational structures are critical for the success of 
community action. India has established institutional 
arrangements for community watershed management that extend 
from the central and state levels to the grassroots level. At the 
local level, a number of land owners form user groups (UGs) while 
landless and marginal farmers form self-help groups (SHGs) that 
together establish a watershed association (WA), which will be 
led by a watershed committee (WC). The WA serves as the rule 
and decision-making body with the WC as its executive arm. The 
WC is made up of representatives from SHGs, UGs, the Panchayat 
(Village Council) and the Watershed Development Team (WDT). 
The WDT is a multi-disciplinary team of advisors constituted by 
the District Watershed Committee. Selected watersheds receive 
about US$50,000 from the government in the form of public strategic 
investment to establish local institutions for collective action and 
to implement IWM activities. User SHGs are expected to make 
additional cash and in-kind contributions towards this strategic 
public support. 
     This shows the clear responsibility that the governments could 
play in creating enabling conditions. What roles should other 
players in the process of watershed management play? Obviously, 
it will be the primary responsibility of the individual farmers to 
manage privately owned land and other resources. It will, however, 
be the primary role of the community to invest and manage common 
property resources. The non-governmental research and 
development institutions will have an important role in supporting 
farmers, communities (and the government) in providing essential 
resources, innovations and best practices for improving 
productivity and the environmental resource base. It is critical 
that the different actors work in close partnership with a common 
goal and vision. Such a coalition of the willing should be 
established based on a team spirit and based on the principles of 
complementarity and comparative advantage. 
     However, it will be the responsibility of all players to contribute 
towards building of effective and sustainable institutions  (Table 
1). As local institutions are developed, it is useful to note the need 
for an exit strategy for the partners and to hand over the primary 
responsibility for management of all the local public goods to the 
community. This does not mean that technical backstopping and 
periodic monitoring by the NGOs and governments should be 
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stopped. Success will depend on the ability of the communities to 
adjust to the changing conditions as well as leadership and 
governance for coordination of resource use and conflict 
resolution
Determinants of Community Collective Action
Incentives for collective action vary with the type of collective 
action problem that communities and resource users face. 
Conceptual framework that shows that adoption of HYVs is scale 
neutral while IPM technology and watershed management require 
spatial coordination and cooperation among affected farmers has 
been developed 12. The emergence of collective action in a given 
context depends on the awareness of interdependence and 
realization of potential welfare gains from coordinating the 
activities of individual agents. Individual choices to participate in 
collective action are contingent upon expectations of the behavior 
of others. Even if the potential gains are high, cooperative behavior 
may not translate into practice unless individuals expect other 
potential beneficiaries to do likewise. The presence of assurance 
and trust facilitates the potential for reciprocity and emergence of 
cooperative behavior 21, 22, 31. Individual participation may also 
depend on household-specific (idiosyncratic) factors that 
determine the transaction costs and benefits from participation. 
The household’s existing stock of physical and financial assets 
as well as human and social capital can especially play a significant 
role in determining the relative gains from participation. The 
success of collective action in a given situation once it evolves 
depends on several factors. The classic impediments of collective 
action are group size and inequality 14. Synthesis of case studies 
describes many success stories of collective action in governing 
commons – incidences where people, recognizing a need, have 
created institutions that overcome the problems of collective action 
and allow them to organize successfully for the collective benefit15.
A number of factors, either internal or external to the group, were 
identified as important determinants for the success of collective 
efforts in managing commons. These include clearly defined 
boundaries, monitoring, mechanisms for conflict resolution, 
recognition of rights to organize and presence of graduated 
sanctions to penalize violators 15.
     The empirical evidence on the role of any of these factors under 
specific situations is quite mixed. Some of the factors widely 
attributed to the success of collective efforts of farmer organizations 
have been synthesized and include homogeneity, size, choice of 
services, commercial activities, self-reliance and autonomy, 
finance, skills and education, participation, organizational structure 
and governance, legislation and focus 28. Many of these factors 
are generally considered to be relevant for collective watershed 
management. The effect of these factors on collective action seems 
to depend on the socioeconomic and institutional context and the 
nature of the contested resources. Are homogenous groups more 
successful and what is the optimal size for effective collective 
action? There is no single answer to these questions. It is generally 
recognized that the size of the organization will depend on the 
type and scale of activities being collectively undertaken and 
should match the organizational abilities of its members. For 
example, national and regional organizations are more suited for 
policy advocacy while local level organizations are preferable for 
marketing, resource management and provision of credit 32.
Collective action reduces transaction costs and the economies of 
scale may increase to a certain level as group size increases. The 
transaction and managerial costs of cooperation may, however, 
increase faster than the gains as group size increases beyond a 
certain level 5. This indicates that, among other things, the ‘optimal’ 
size will depend on the type of activity and skills of members. 
    There is, however, a serious paucity of empirical studies in 
relation to watershed management at both household and group 
levels. Factors that determine the emergence and evolution of 
collective action to control soil erosion using data from 22 micro 
multi-owner catchments in Haiti have been investigated 31. The 
study highlights how realization of interdependence, assurance 
about the behavior of others and a critical mass of motivated 
individuals contribute to successful cooperation in watershed 
management. Similar to the findings in the study of Indian 
watersheds 9, 10, this study also identifies the critical role that 
equity in the distribution of benefits can play in sustaining 
collective efforts. Other case studies on collective action in NRM 
have analyzed canal irrigation systems in India 13 and small 
irrigation systems in Mexico 2. The study on the determinants of 
collective action in canal irrigation in India analyzed the correlates 
for existence of farmer organizations and collective action for 
irrigation management. It was found that communities far from 
markets are unlikely to have local organizations for irrigation 
management, perhaps indicating how market opportunities 
enhance the incentives for cooperation in irrigation water 
management. The presence of water user associations improved 
the probability of maintenance of irrigation canals while the increase 
in the number of villages in each minor system reduced it 13. The 
Mexican study showed  that social heterogeneity and landholding 
inequality are significantly correlated with lower maintenance of 
irrigation systems 2.
Roles for different actors Issue
Household Community Government NGOs for research and 
development
Private land & water 
management
Primary  Secondary  Secondary 
(targeted subsidies, etc)  
Secondary (advisory role and 
social protection) 
Common property 
resources and assets 
Secondary 
(compliance)
Primary  
(Collective action) 
Secondary (cost-sharing 
for investments) 
Secondary (support 
communities and households) 
Policies, rules and 
regulations
Secondary  
(compliance)
Secondary  
(enforce rules and 
policies) 
Primary (legislator) Secondary (advice on good 
policies and best practices) 
Institution building Secondary Primary Primary Primary 
Table 1. The role of different players in community-based watershed management. 
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Impacts of Collective Action – Some Examples
Do communities benefit from IWM? Collective action in 
watershed management has the potential to provide multiple 
economic and environmental benefits – tangible and non-tangible 
– to rural communities. Such collective action allows smallholder 
farmers to jointly invest in management practices that provide 
collective benefits to all members. While watershed management 
contributes to enhancing resource productivity and sustainability, 
increased commercialization and market access provides the outlet 
for disposing the surplus generated and the opportunity to 
diversify into high-value crops and creates the economic 
incentives for agricultural intensification and adoption of new 
technologies. Based on quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
panel data collected from household surveys, PRA studies and 
focus group discussions, the environmental and economic benefits 
derived from implementation of IWM interventions in Adarsha 
watershed are presented. The study also documents the 
associated effects of IWM on commercialization of subsistence 
agriculture and increased participation of smallholder farmers in 
markets.
    Adarsha watershed is located in Kothapally village (longitude 
78°5’ to 78°8’E and latitude 17°20’ to 17°24’ N) in Ranga Reddy 
district, Andhra Pradesh, nearly 40 km from ICRISAT, Patancheru. 
It covers 465 ha of which 430 ha are cultivated and the rest is non- 
cultivated marginal land. The IWM interventions were 
implemented through a consortium that included ICRISAT, Indian 
NARS, local government, NGOs and the local community. This 
drought-prone village/catchment was selected in 1997 based on 
its high vulnerability to drought, severity of water scarcity, the 
extent of land degradation and widespread poverty relative to 
other dryland villages in the district 30.
   (a) Environmental benefits: The environmental benefits were 
not valued but measured using selected biophysical indicators 
such as changes in runoff, soil loss, groundwater levels and 
ground cover that were monitored over time. The soil and water 
management measures implemented in the watershed included 
field bunding, gully plugging and check dams built at certain 
intervals along the main watercourse that cuts across the village 
and catchment. In order to facilitate comparability, untreated areas 
within the catchment that contained only farmers’ practices without 
any technological interventions served as counterfactuals to 
determine the effect of soil and water conservation measures. The 
evidence collected for two years (2000–2001) shows a significant 
reduction in runoff and soil loss from the treated segment of the 
watershed compared to the untreated portion  (Table 2). The runoff 
has declined by about 20 to 60%, the highest reduction coming 
from years with high rainfall. Although soil erosion levels were 
not measured in all years, the results from 2001 show over 60% 
reduction in erosion levels. 
   The changes in groundwater levels were monitored using 62 
geo-referenced open wells located along the main watercourse in 
the watershed at differing distances from the check dams 
constructed for recharging groundwater levels. The results show 
a significant improvement in the yields of most wells, particularly 
those located near check dams (Fig. 1). The land cover and 
vegetation density studied using satellite images also shows an 
increase in vegetation cover  from 129 ha in 1996 to 200 ha in 
200023.
    (b) Economic benefits: The average net income from the three 
major sources (crops, livestock and off-farm) and their relative 
share in 2001 and 2002 is given in Table 3. The income from crops 
is computed as returns to family labor and land, i.e., net of all 
variable costs other than owned land and family labor using the 
2001 constant prices. Did IWM make a significant contribution 
to crop and total household income? In 2001, the average crop 
income was about 20% higher in the project villages, but the 
difference increased to about 300% in 2002. Overall household 
income was 47% higher in the project villages in 2001, but declined 
to 37% in 2002. This seems to indicate a significant effect of 
IWM. In order to isolate the effect of other correlated influences, 
an econometric model was used to estimate the relative effect of 
IWM and drought factors on crop income and total household 
income. The results have shown a significant effect of IWM on 
crop income and overall household income even in years where 
drought occurs 27.
    (c) Drought mitigation benefits: The basic goal of watershed 
management in drought-prone rain-fed systems is to improve 
livelihood security by mitigating the negative effects of climatic 
variability while protecting or enhancing the sustainability of the 
environment and the agricultural resource base. As shown above, 
adoption of soil and water conservation interventions resulted 
in significant reductions in runoff and soil erosion, rise in the 
groundwater level and increase in vegetation cover. Hence, 
additional land is brought under cultivation in the project villages 
using small-scale and supplemental irrigation in the post-rainy 
season using improved varieties and cropping systems. Adoption 
of improved practices has resulted in increased land productivity 
and profitability of crops and cropping sequences. The mean 
income for the two groups of households from alternative sources 
(crops, livestock and off-farm) in 2001 and 2002 is given in Fig. 2. 
The average rainfall in 2002 (571 mm) was about 16% less than 
that in 2001 (676 mm). 
   The results show that crop and household incomes are generally 
higher in 2001 than in the drought year 2002. In 2001, crop incomes 
constituted about 36 and 44% of household income in Adarsha 
watershed and in the non-project villages, respectively. In 2002, 
crop income for the non-project village declined by 80% while it 
only declined by about a third in the project village. Hence, the 
contribution of crop income to household incomes in the non- 
project villages declined to a mere 12% while it remained 
unchanged at about 36% in the project villages. This was largely 
compensated by increased migration and off-farm employment 
in the non-project villages, where the share of off-farm income 
increased from about 50% in 2001 to almost 75% in 2002. This 
shows how IWM has contributed to stability of crop incomes in 
the watershed despite the serious drought conditions in 2002. 
Runoff (mm) Soil loss (t/ha) Year Rainfall 
(mm) Untreated 1 Treated Untreated Treated 
1999 584 16 * * * 
2000 1161 118 65 4.17 1.46 
2001 612 31 22 1.48 0.51 
2002 464 13 Nil 0.18 Nil 
2003 689 76 44 3.20 1.10 
2004 667 126 39 3.53 0.53 
Table 2. The impact of watershed management on runoff and 
soil loss, Adarsha watershed, 1999–2004. 
1Untreated = control with no development work, Treated = with improved soil water and crop 
management technologies, * Not installed. 
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  (d) Agricultural diversification and commercialization:
Another potential social benefit of IWM is related to its 
contribution for transforming and re-orienting traditional 
agriculture towards commercial farming. Integrated watershed- 
based interventions that combine improved soil, water and pest 
management with new cultivars and livestock management 
options seek to address the binding biotic and abiotic constraints 
in the system. This reduces the pervasive production risk and 
improves the productivity of the system. Improved water 
availability helps to diversify production towards high-value 
products (e.g., legumes, vegetables, fruits, trees, livestock, etc.), 
boost the productivity through supplemental irrigation and 
mitigate the risk of drought-induced crop-livestock losses. 
Adoption of integrated and complementary interventions and 
the associated higher productivity allows hitherto subsistence 
or sub-subsistence level households to be able to diversify 
income sources and generate sizable marketable surpluses. The 
reduced production and market risk creates opportunities for 
largely subsistence farmers to begin to trust local markets and 
gradually reduce self-sufficiency. This would create opportunities 
for diversification into high-value products and enhanced market 
participation although risk-averse farmers may still prefer to 
ensure food security for products for which markets cannot be 
fully relied on. 
     A similar process of change has taken place in Adarsha 
watershed. An analysis of the crop choice decisions and the 
level of marketed surplus of sample farmers support these 
observations. Based on census data for 2001, Fig. 3 shows the 
percentage of farmers that grow the different crops within and 
outside the project villages. About 26% of the growers (compared 
to 33% in the non-project villages) in the project village grow low 
value cereals (mainly sorghum). In terms of diversification into 
high value cereals (paddy, wheat and maize) the comparative 
shares are 29% within the watershed project villages and 22% in 
the adjoining non-project village. In general, except for low value 
cereals and pulses, a larger percentage of farmers in the project 
villages have diversified production into high value cereals, oil 
crops and cash crops (cotton, sugarcane, vegetables and fruits), 
which contributes to growth and diversification of income sources. 
The drivers of change in Adarsha watershed: Preliminary
assessment of data collected through household and community 
surveys and participatory rural appraisals show several driving 
factors that contributed to the success of collective action in 
Adarsha watershed. These include the following: a) acute water 
stress, b) shared goals and common interest, c) good leadership, 
d) active participation in design and implementation, e) knowledge- 
Year Village 
group
Statistics Crop  
income 
Livestock 
income 
Off-farm
income 
Household
income 
2001 Non-Project Mean 12.7 1.9 14.3 28.9 
  (N=60) Std. dev. 23.3 3.8 12.6 26.3 
% 44.0 6.6 49.5 100.0 
 Project Mean 15.4 4.4 22.7 42.5 
 (N=60) Std. dev. 16.4 6.4 45.0 51.3 
% 36.2 10.4 53.4 100.0 
2002 Non-Project Mean 2.5 2.7 15.0 20.2 
 (N=60) Std. dev. 13.4 4.7 30.0 36.9 
% 12.2 13.3 74.5 100.0 
 Project Mean 10.1 4.0 13.4 27.6 
 (N=60) Std. dev. 19.4 6.7 17.8 31.3 
% 36.7 14.6 48.7 100.0 
Table 3. The effect of watershed management interventions on 
alternative sources of household income (Rs 1000). 
36 % 10 % 54 %
44 % 7% 49 %
12% 13 % 75 %
37 % 15 % 48 % 28.9
20.2
42.5
27.6
Crops Livestock Non-farm 
Figure 2. Effects on income sources and stability and resilience of 
livelihoods.
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based interventions for private benefits and equity, f) training 
and capacity enhancement, g) a coalition of partners with a shared 
vision.
 In summary, we find that when water scarcity is a commonly felt 
need for the community, and when local institutions that provide 
good governance and leadership are in place along with knowledge 
based entry points and local capacity building, the community 
with shared goal/s was able to participate more actively in 
implementing the watershed program which led to significant 
improvements in both economic and environmental conditions in 
the watershed. However, there are some remaining challenges (e.g., 
the threat of depletion of groundwater) that may influence the 
sustainability of the watershed interventions. There will be a need 
to spread the equity impacts of IWM and evolve local norms and 
mechanisms that help regulate utilization of groundwater. 
Summary and Conclusions
Smallholder farmers in the drought-prone areas of South Asia are 
poor, have low capabilities for risk taking and are unable to invest 
in best practices that enhance livelihood resilience and ecosystem 
health, especially when such investments are characterized by 
long gestation periods. However, experiences from semi-arid areas 
of India show that integrated interventions for watershed 
management and improved access to innovations and markets 
can be promising strategies for diversification into high-value 
products, improved resilience of livelihoods and enhanced 
resource use sustainability. However, a watershed is a complex 
biophysical and socioeconomic unit that necessitates special 
policy support and institutional arrangements for emergence of 
local collective action. Whereas technical considerations justify 
a watershed approach as a suitable spatial landscape unit for 
intervention, social considerations and the need for collective 
action dictate a community or village unit as a basis for such 
interventions. The biophysical and social complexities and the 
need to harmonize the two for sustainable management of water 
and soil resources require suitable policy and institutional 
instruments that encourage and stimulate both private and 
collective efforts. The emergence of local institutions for collective 
action can help internalize externalities and reduce transaction 
costs that limit the incentives for individual farmers to participate 
in sustainable management of local public goods in watersheds. 
This contributes to empowerment of communities and facilitates 
joint investments for improving productivity and resource use 
sustainability at the landscape level. Hence, the community-based 
but landscape wide IWM interventions create synergies between 
targeted technologies, policies and institutions that improve 
productivity, resource use sustainability and market access for 
resource users. 
    India is one of the countries in South Asia that has adopted 
micro-watershed development as a strategy for poverty reduction 
and sustainable rural development in dryland areas. Experiences 
in semi-arid areas of India show that when property rights to 
collectively held resources and investments are clearly defined 
and beneficiaries respect the agreed rules, farmers in drought- 
prone areas can benefit from increased availability of drinking 
and irrigation water, improved availability of fodder for livestock, 
reduced soil erosion, enhanced sustainability and improved 
environmental quality 4, 8, 10, 25. Such collective investments also 
enhance the profitability of other divisible inputs like fertilizer and 
improved seeds, and encourage adoption of productivity- 
enhancing innovations by individual farmers. 
     The results from analyses of panel data collected from Adarsha 
watershed and adjoining project villages show that IWM 
interventions had a significant positive effect on crop and 
household incomes. Even after controlling for the effect of 
drought, the results indicated higher crop income shares, higher 
crop and household incomes in the IWM village compared to 
adjoining villages that do not benefit from such interventions. 
This shows the vital contribution of IWM interventions in terms 
of diversification of income sources into high-value products and 
mitigating the effects of drought-induced shocks on livelihoods. 
We also found that IWM had accelerated diversification into high- 
value products and significantly enhanced the marketed surplus 
of smallholder farmers, contributing towards commercialization of 
production. However, there are several cases where watershed 
management had failed in India and it would be useful to 
understand the major drivers for emergence and sustainability of 
effective community action. The experience of Adarsha watershed 
provides useful insights on these factors. Government support 
for establishing key local institutions and implement tested IWM 
interventions in partnership with the community was a critical 
first step that laid the foundation for collective efforts. The 
incentive problems for enabling the participation of small farmers 
in IWM were initially addressed through on-farm interventions 
that improved crop yields and incomes for individual farmers. 
This was further enhanced through linked livelihood opportunities 
(e.g., production of bio-pesticides and bio-fertilizers) for the 
landless and marginal farmers who may not directly benefit from 
irrigation and higher land productivity. In order to spread the 
benefits widely and more equitably, low-cost water recharging 
and harvesting structures were constructed along the watercourse. 
The remarkable progress made in Adarsha watershed needs to be 
replicated in other dryland villages across the region. 
    However, more work is needed to better understand why certain 
types of groups fail and others succeed; how governments and 
other stakeholders can play an active role in the process; how 
the benefits and costs of IWM can be distributed more equitably; 
how landless and marginal farmers can benefit from collective 
action; and how new kinds of institutional arrangements for 
collective action can be developed to regulate groundwater use, 
reduce depletion and ensure sustainability. 
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